confessing, “I know now without any hesitation ... that [my husband’s job] must come first.” In 1921 the popular magazine Outlook and Independent quoted the dean of Barnard College, a women’s college in New York City, telling her students that “perhaps the greatest service that you can render to the community ... is to have the courage to refuse to work for gain.” And on its front page in 1935, the New York Times reported that women “suffering from masculine psychological states” and an “aversion to marriage” were being “cured” by the removal of their adrenal gland. In this atmosphere, not only were women workers under fire, but women who centered their lives on women rather than on men came under attack. Lesbianism was no longer chic. Lesbian bars almost disappeared. Homosexuality was now seen by many people as just one more threat to the family.

On the other hand, movie houses showed zany screwball comedies with more complicated lessons. Often, deliciously ditzy, incompetent women were rescued by sensible, capable men—yet men were also frequently portrayed as bumbling or slower-witted than the women. Sometimes the men needed joy and whimsy restored to their lives, not an unexpected theme for a nation in the throes of an economic depression.

In other movies, women were by no means incompetent. The women portrayed by Katharine Hepburn, Bette Davis, and Joan Crawford in the 1930s were often intelligent but needed men to tame and soften them. At the other end of the spectrum, in the dancing movies of Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, Rogers often played the responsible, capable, working partner while Astaire’s devil-may-care ways needed reforming. Their movies usually ended not with blissful domestic life for her but with successful professional partnership for them both.

How were women to understand their roles through these films? Were they to go from the free but irresponsible flapper to the submissive, nurturing wife who could lighten the burden of dark days but stay safely in her place? Or was there another model still available? It was, after all, in the 1930s that Babe Didrikson emerged as a sports hero, winning two gold medals at the 1932 Olympics, in javelin and hurdles, and a silver in the high jump, and eschewing all feminine wiles. What society demanded of women in the 1930s was complex and contradictory, but it did not completely erode the image of confident, competent, public womanhood created in the 1920s.

Women and the New Deal

In 1931 Emily Newell Blair, a former national vice-chairman of the Democratic party, wrote an article entitled “Why I Am Discouraged about Women in Politics.” “Now at the end of ten years of suffrage,” she confessed, “I find politics still a male monopoly. It is hardly easier for women to get themselves elected to office than it was before the Equal Suffrage Amendment was passed. Women still have little part in framing political policies and determining party tactics.” Indeed, Blair claimed
that women had less of a voice in party leadership than they had in 1920, when, as an unknown quantity, they had been courted by male politicians.

In the 1930s, few women held elected office. Of the dozen women who served in Congress at some point during the decade, only two were active on women's issues. Blair lamented, "Unfortunately for feminism, it was agreed to drop the sex line in politics. And it was dropped by the women. Even those who ran for office forgot that they were women." Yet the 1930s saw a dramatic increase in women's political influence through appointed, rather than elected, offices. It came as the fruit of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's program, the New Deal that he promised Americans when they elected him President in 1932. The increase in influence was also the result of his wife Eleanor's strong and deeply rooted networks among women reformers and her political abilities as a shaper of New Deal policy.

By early 1933, when Roosevelt took office, the depression was four years old. Herbert Hoover, elected President in 1928, had hesitated to intervene drastically in the economy. Hoover had created public works projects that erected large dams but employed few workers. He had provided some support for banks and had said many encouraging things, but the economy went from bad to worse.

Faced with declining opportunities and increased racial hostility, ten thousand Puerto Ricans headed for home, and many Chinese returned to China. Unable to create jobs or to meet the needs of the unemployed, officials in the Southwest closed ranks against Mexican and Mexican-Americans, accusing them of stealing jobs and using up relief dollars. In 1932, officials in Los Angeles rounded up all the Mexicans they could find, put them and their American-born children in boxcars, and sent them to Mexico. In all across the United States, these deportations—approximately 400,000 Mexicans. They solved nothing. Indeed, many "Mexicans" on relief roles were, in fact, U.S. citizens, born and raised on this side of the border. To the officials responsible, however, they all looked alike.

Many Chicanos made their way to the cities in search of opportunities or help. They were joined by 400,000 African-Americans migrating from the South to the North for the same reason. And farmers, who had lost their homes, along with tenant farmers unable to get leases, called west, as one observer noted, "like a parade." Whole counties hit the road.

The cities offered no respite from the hard times. In 1933 half the workers in Cleveland were unemployed, as were 80 percent of those in Toledo. Average family income plummeted from $2,300 in 1929 to $1,500 in 1933. In 1932 28 percent of U.S. households had no employed worker at all. Even those who had work suffered. Stenographers in New York who had made forty dollars a week in 1929 were making only sixteen dollars four years later. Most working women in Chicago earned less than twenty-five cents an hour. Unable to pay their teachers, school districts cut school to three days a week, to two months a year, or simply closed them altogether, depriving a third of a million children of school in 1932.

2. People looked to Roosevelt's administration to make order of the chaos, to reopen the banks and schools, and to put people back to work. In the process of accomplishing these tasks, the Roosevelts and their allies changed the relationship between individuals and the government. With her long history of work in social welfare, Eleanor Roosevelt stood at the center of that change.

Anna Eleanor Roosevelt had been born into an old, wealthy, and distinguished New York family. By the time Eleanor was ten, both her parents had died—her mother after an operation and her father from alcoholism. She spent the rest of her childhood with relatives. When she reached fifteen, she was sent to a London boarding school. When Roosevelt returned to New York to enter high society, she plunged into social service activities. At the age of eighteen, she worked at the Rivington Street Settlement House, teaching calisthenics and dancing to the impoverished neighbors. She also joined the National Consumers' League, which used the power of consumers to try to better the conditions of workers, particularly women. Employers who met the Consumers' League standards could use the League label, and consumers could buy the goods they produced knowing they had been produced under decent conditions. Roosevelt visited the clothing factories and sweatshops that the League targeted and never forgot what she saw.

Roosevelt married her cousin, Franklin Roosevelt, an ambitious young Harvard graduate, in March 1905. For the next ten years Eleanor was either pregnant or recovering from pregnancy. She helped Franklin's early political career by organizing and hosting social and political gatherings. Then, in 1917, she discovered that her husband was having an affair with her trusted friend, Lucy Mercer. Devastated, she offered him a divorce, but a divorce would have ruined his political career and deprived him of a valued friend and partner. The couple reconciled, and both plunged into politics.

Even the setback of Franklin's lifelong paralysis from a polio attack in 1921 could not stop the Roosevelts. During the 1920s, Franklin played an ever-increasing role in the Democratic party, and Eleanor joined reform organizations, including the Women's Trade Union League. She discovered in the women reformers a warm, supportive network of friends and an astute set of politicians. This warmth sustained her in the rough and tumble political world. In particular, her intimate relationship with journalist Lorena Hickok provided the essential emotional support, she could no longer get from her husband. In turn, as early as 1924, women reformers saw Eleanor Roosevelt as a major leader. By 1928 she expressed her frustration that these women politicians met with so few rewards. She would carry this sense of politics and reform—and this network of women—with her into the White House in 1933.

3. The women who would join Eleanor Roosevelt in Washington were not new to politics. In overlapping networks, they had been building connections and careers throughout the 1910s and 1920s. For example, Mary W. Dewson started her career
in Massachusetts reform and suffrage circles. In the 1920s in New York, she served as the civic secretary of the Women's City Club and the research secretary of the National Consumers' League. By 1929 Dewson knew all the leading women reformers in the city. With these connections in mind, Eleanor Roosevelt recruited her into Democratic politics. By 1937 Dewson was vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee and on a number of government advisory boards. Dewson wanted to use political appointments both to get nonpartisan women reformers into the government and to reward loyal Democratic women. For his part, Franklin Roosevelt wanted to be the first President to appoint a woman to the cabinet. In Frances Perkins he found an ideal candidate with connections to both political and reform networks.

Perkins had graduated from Mount Holyoke College in 1902, worked in settlement houses in Chicago, and then studied and conducted research for her master's degree in sociology and economics at Columbia University. She had worked for the Consumers' League as a lobbyist. In 1918 Governor Al Smith appointed her to the New York State Industrial Commission. In 1928 the new governor, Franklin Roosevelt, appointed Perkins Industrial Commissioner, a promotion. After he was elected President, Roosevelt agreed to nominate Perkins as secretary of labor, and Dewson launched a nationwide campaign in her support.

Other women received posts in every agency from the diplomatic corps and the U.S. Mint to the Consumers' Advisory Board of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), an economic agency that was part of the New Deal program. Under Roosevelt, a higher percentage of women received government appointments than ever before, except during World War I.

Women fared best in new agencies. In the seven newest New Deal agencies, including the Social Security Board, the Works Progress Administration, and the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, women made up 44.4 percent of the employees in 1939. The ten executive departments were another story. In the Departments of Labor, State, and Interior, women constituted more than one-third of the employees, but in the Departments of War, Navy, Commerce, and the Post Office, they ranged from 15.2 percent to only 5.5 percent of employees.

Some women had built up political networks over the previous decades whose networks touched, rather than overlapped, those of Eleanor Roosevelt and Mary Dewson. Mary McLeod Bethune was one such woman. Born in South Carolina in the 1870s, the fifteenth of seventeen children, she was the one chosen to attend school and teach the others. A determined mother and scholarships helped Bethune, who was proud of her African heritage, attend a seminary, a bible school, and a number of mission schools in pursuit of her desire to be a missionary in Africa. During her training, Bethune married and had a child. As her efforts to go to Africa failed, she realized that her true mission was in the United States and founded a school for girls in Daytona, Florida; in 1929, it became Bethune-Cookman College.

But Bethune's activities ranged far beyond her school. A vital force in women's clubs, in 1924 she was elected president of the National Association of Colored Women (NACW). Like all Bethune's organizations, it had a large vision, working to secure a federal antilynching bill, helping rural women and women in industry, training clerks and typists, and raising the status of women in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Haiti, and Africa. Bethune knew that the number of black women graduating from college was increasing but that the status of black working women had declined in depression conditions. She wanted to mobilize the power of college women on behalf of the others. She felt frustrated with the lack of progress, the conservatism of the NACW, and the difficulties of working in mixed-race organizations such as the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, whose white members had refused to support a federal antilynching law, claiming it violated states' rights. Though Bethune remained more friendly to such groups than did many black women leaders, she decided to found her own organization. On December 5, 1935, she held the founding meeting of the National Council of Negro Women at the Harlem branch of the YWCA.
Bethune's stature had led to her involvement in national-level politics. In 1928, she had participated in the White House Conference on Child Welfare. Yet the New Deal was slow to call on her. As late as 1929, Franklin Roosevelt had boasted that he had never lunched with an African American. He ignored NAACP requests to support a civil rights platform. African Americans supported Roosevelt only because of his job creation and welfare programs. Then, in 1934, Eleanor Roosevelt began taking public stands on racial issues. Unlike her husband, she lent her public support to the anti lynching bill. Finally, in 1936, when 76 percent of the black vote returned Roosevelt to office, despite the defection of white Southern Democrats, Roosevelt responded with black political appointments.

The press called the new appointees the "Black Cabinet." Bethune was among them. She directed the Negro Division of the National Youth Administration (NYA), whose mandate was to find jobs for people between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four. Bethune soon made her mark. Seeing the Black Cabinet divided by internal disputes, she organized its members into the Federal Council of Negro Affairs to achieve consensus on policy issues. She also made certain that black universities benefited from the NYA, implementing a small, special scholarship fund for African-American college students because of their greater need. In the 1930s, 45 percent of the fathers of black college students worked in unskilled, low-paying jobs; only 4.7 percent of white students' fathers did.

Many black southern women with fewer connections, less education, and less power than Bethune, surrounded by the terrorist, racist activities of the Ku Klux Klan, felt they had no choice but to repress their anger and resentment in order to keep their jobs and provide for their families. Bethune would have to express their feelings for them. She did not hesitate. In a typical moment, she wrote to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on learning that the War Department had failed to invite black women to a 1941 conference on organizing women for the war effort, "We are not humiliated. We are incensed."

Together these women, black and white, tried to ensure that other women benefited from New Deal programs. They were consummate lobbyists. Eleanor Roosevelt had unprecedented access to policymakers, addressing committees of the House of Representatives, conferring with committee chairmen, and sending members of Congress letters demanding the appointment of a coordinator of child care—all while claiming to act only as a private citizen.

With public charities running dry and states going bankrupt, the federal government swept in like a benign wind. The New Deal created massive temporary job programs and provided relief payments, first through the Federal Relief Administration (FERA), created in March 1933 with $500 million, and the Public Works Administration (PWA), which funded major construction projects with $3.3 billion. Then, in the desperate winter of 1933–34, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) was established; it hired 2.6 million people within a month. At its peak in January 1934, the CWA employed more than 4 million people with wages averaging about fifteen dollars per week, twice the usual FERA rate. When the depression lingered, at Roosevelt's request Congress passed the Emergency Relief Act, under which Roosevelt created the Works Progress Administration (WPA) with the largest single appropriation to that date, $4.88 billion, in order to create jobs.

The New Deal also attempted a more permanent restructuring of the economy. In 1933 the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which created the National Recovery Administration (NRA), tried to stabilize production on farms and in factories. These agencies tried to ensure decent working conditions by bringing consumers, employers, and workers together to create codes for the industries and prices and quotas for the farmers. They also made it harder for employers to discriminate against workers for joining a union. These measures were so popular that when the Supreme Court declared the laws unconstitutional in 1935 and 1936, new, more carefully drafted laws swiftly replaced the major provisions of the AAA and the provisions of the NIRA that protected workers' rights. Industrial codes were abandoned, but in 1938 the Fair Labor Standards Act legislated minimum wages and maximum hours, and this time the Supreme Court let the act stand.

The federal government also entered more permanently and more broadly into social welfare. Finally, the United States, like most European countries, had unemployment insurance, old age insurance (Social Security), and aid to dependent children. The last was a provision of the 1935 Social Security Act drafted by the reformers Grace Abbott and Katherine Lenroot, who headed the Children's Bureau. For the first time, the U.S. government became a major guarantor of family welfare.

6. Some of these programs greatly benefited women; others had mixed and often unexpected consequences. New Deal programs employed countless numbers of women. They also kept many women in college; 45 percent of the college students helped by the NYA in 1936–37 were women. The number of women in college rose almost as fast as the number of men, from 480,000 in 1930 to 601,000 in 1940. For many women, New Deal programs made the difference between starvation and survival, or between despair and self-respect. Stella Boone and Ethel Stringer took time out from their new jobs as WPA Adult Education teachers at a Hispanic secondary school in San Antonio to write to Eleanor Roosevelt in 1936, "Many of us were desperate," they explained, "the unhappy victims of circumstances over which we had no control. . . . It is unalterably true that shabbiness and hunger are the foes of self-respect. With our homes broken, our children scattered, our souls torn with anguish and desperation . . . Some of us had lost our homes which were nearly paid for; had sold our furniture, piece by piece, our jewelry, and even most of our clothes. . . . Just when all seemed lost and maddened by grief and fear, we were ready for anything, this Adult Educational Program came, providing us with a means of livelihood, a ladder up which we could climb again to patriotism and self-respect."
In such programs, Hispanic and Anglo women in San Antonio studied business and clerical subjects in the hope of obtaining white-collar employment. With its vast bureaucracy, the New Deal did provide many clerical and professional jobs throughout the government. At the state level, women ran the WPA’s Division of Women’s Work. They also participated in the WPA’s writing, music, and theater projects. Zora Neale Hurston collected folklore from African Americans in Florida for the WPA Writers Project. Photographers Dorothea Lange and Marion Post Wolcott took pictures for the Farm Security Administration. Other women worked in government-funded positions in hospitals, nursery schools, and cafeterias or cleaned public buildings and organized city records.

Most women’s work projects consisted, however, of sewing rooms, where workers made garments for relief recipients; food processing, such as canning factories; health care; and domestic-service training programs. In San Antonio, for example, by early 1936, the WPA employed 1,280 women and just over twice that many men in professional projects. On the other hand, a single sewing room in that city employed 2,300 people. In the country as a whole, 56 percent of the women employed by the WPA worked in sewing rooms.

New Deal policies focused on promoting domestic roles for women; administrators tended to see women as temporary workers who were helping out in an emergency and would return to the home after the depression. Why teach them nondomestic skills if they would never use them? Operating procedures in the WPA mandated that job preference be given to female heads of, or if none existed, to adult male children in the household. Only if a husband was absent or disabled and no adult sons lived at home could women receive a high priority at the agency. Even in the National Youth Administration, men received preference over women in job placement. The WPA limited the proportion of jobs it opened to women to between 12 and 16 percent.

There were other limits to the New Deal programs. Social Security excluded domestic servants and agricultural workers, and by doing so excluded most black female and Chicana workers; in the 1930s, 90 percent of black women worked in agricultural labor or domestic service. No code and, later, no minimum wage or maximum hours law covered these workers. Nor was government relief evenly distributed. It went disproportionately to whites. Black women in the South and Chicanas in the Southwest found themselves ousted from work relief programs and had to take poorly paid domestic work or labor in the cotton or vegetable and fruit fields. In addition, the New Deal’s crop reduction policies, geared toward increasing agricultural prices by reducing supply, led landowners to evict large numbers of black women who had raised crops on their land as tenants or sharecroppers.

The administrators of government programs were overwhelmingly white. They had little interest in creating jobs programs that would pull women of color away from domestic service, and they were thoroughly imbued with the racial attitudes that dominated their regions. In 1935 Opportunity, the journal of the Urban League, quoted a Georgia black woman who complained, “When I go to them for help they talk to me like I was a dog.” Some government officials simply refused relief to black or Chicano clients. Mosel Brinson of Georgia wrote to the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1935, “I am a widow woman with seven head of children, and I live on my place with a plent of help. All are good workers and I wants to farm. I has no mule, no wagon, no feed, no grocery, and these women and men that is controlling the Civil Work for the Government won’t help me.” She added a telling postscript: “P.S. These poor white people that lives around me wants the colored people to work for them for nothing and if you won’t do that they comes down to the relief office and tell the women,—don’t help the colored people, we will give them plenty of work to do, but they won’t work.”

Yet white program directors continued to create programs that channeled women of color into domestic service. Mary Katherine Dickson, who administered federal relief programs in San Antonio in 1937, complained that “the majority of housewives in San Antonio have a very real servant problem on their hands and, at present, no means of solving it satisfactorily.” She offered her proposal for training black adults in domestic service as the best solution to their unemployment and white housewives’ needs, because “between 75% and 85% of persons employed in household service are black.” She condemned the public school system for providing the same curriculum and the same expectations for black and white students.

In Denver, officials found they could not fill the classes they had created to train Chicanas in domestic service. Chicanas and black women found almost any other kind of work preferable. Some of these women benefited from New Deal-sponsored classes in clerical skills, but most avoided domestic work by finding jobs in WPA sewing rooms, and even some sewing rooms discriminated. In Fayetteville, North Carolina, officials closed the sewing project and opened a cleaning project for black women. And, unlike white women, black women in the WPA were often assigned to heavy outdoor labor. A physician in Florence, South Carolina, complained to the WPA in 1936 of a “beautification” project where “women are worked in ‘gangs’ in connection with the City’s dump pile, incinerator and ditch piles.”

Some programs not particularly aimed at women had unexpected results. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 aimed to give Native American tribes increased autonomy by creating tribal governments built around newly written constitutions. Although the underlying sentiment of the act was a new respect for tribal cultures, the new constitutions tended to be built on white models. In tribes where women had been excluded from formal political participation, they gained new voting power, and new women leaders emerged. In other tribes, women lost economic rights and political power. Among the Navajo, for example, New Deal policies of reducing stock in the name of conserving overgrazed land lessened the economic power of women, who were the traditional tribal stock owners. At the same time, jobs programs favoring men made the Navajo men less dependent
economically on the clan's women and less willing to contribute their income to the extended family.

Even industrial codes aimed at improving work conditions could backfire. Wages increased rapidly. Between July 1933 and August 1934, southern women textile workers doubled their hourly wages, a more rapid increase than the men's. Even so, however, the twelve dollars a week they now received would scarcely make ends meet. Besides, most received only three-fourths of that amount because, to meet code requirements regarding the number of work hours per week, many mills closed every fourth week. Short hours and production cuts undermined women's wage advances. Increased demands for productivity, on the other hand, made a mockery of the reduction to an eight-hour day. Higher wages could also lead to mechanization and layoffs as machines became cheaper than human workers. In 1935 a black woman worker told an NRA investigator, "They laid off one-fourth of the people in my room after the last raise we got."

Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins may not have been entirely satisfied with the treatment women got from the New Deal. In her papers at the National Archives there is an unsigned, unattributed, undated "Resolution on Unemployment and Working Women." According to that document, "They have been thrown out of jobs as married women, refused relief as single women, discriminated against by the N.R.A. and ignored by the C.W.A." Pondering these issues in 1935, writer and editor Genevieve Parkhurst wondered in Harper's magazine whether feminism was dead. After all, almost one-fourth of the NRA codes established wage rates for women that were 14 percent to 30 percent lower than those for men, and southern codes for laundries established earnings for black laundresses below precode levels.

The emphasis throughout the Roosevelt administration, including that of Eleanor Roosevelt and Frances Perkins, remained on providing male workers with jobs and supporting families. Single women earners were invisible; married women workers existed only as mothers or wives. WPA rules prohibited the agency from providing work for women eligible for aid from the Aid to Dependent Children program as well as for most married women. Such policies aimed at curbing the seeming trend of women becoming the family breadwinner; if there was no man to do so, the role would be assumed by the state.

With the tremendous anxiety over social stability and fears for the family as the core of social order, few spoke for the woman workers, and feminist individualism was rarely seen. In 1935 the New York Herald Tribune reported that the president of the national League of Women Voters, the organizational heir to the suffrage movement, was defining "a 1935 new-style feminism." This new feminism, she insisted, did not demand that women disappear into their kitchens. Instead, it required "women making good in positions of responsibility, other women backing them up, and all preparing themselves for similar service," as they did in Roosevelt's administration. Yet the new focus was less on personal achievement than it had been in the 1920s. Women social reformers had achieved high visibility and power with the New Deal, and those focusing instead on equal rights for women were in disarray.

The social reformers saw themselves as bettering the world for women, helping women and children fend off economic disaster, fostering the success of women in government positions, and safeguarding the welfare of working women. But in Frances Perkins's Department of Labor, the Children's Bureau expanded rapidly, while the Women's Bureau remained small. That policy decision left childless women stranded and left little room for a notion of women's rights that did not depend on their family roles. Despite its powerful women, the New Deal did not revolutionize the position of women in relation to men or the family.

For all its contradictions, however, the New Deal had drastically changed the relationship of women to the state. By providing Social Security, however limited, unemployment insurance, jobs, NRA hearings where workers could air their grievances directly to federal officials, wage and hour legislation, and other programs, the New Deal altered what people believed they could expect and took new responsibility for the welfare of families and workers. These heightened expectations, particularly among working-class women, led them to take matters into their own hands.

Taking Matters into Their Own Hands

Throughout the 1930s, impoverished and unemployed people found that those from whom they sought help—charity agents, local, state, and federal officials, and employers—all sought to define their needs, aims, and the limits of their aspirations. Some women resisted such definitions and insisted on defining their own needs, desires, and identities. Many went beyond writing letters. They joined together, sometimes with men, sometimes without them, to protest as a community.

Eviction protests offer an example. In journalist Caroline Bird's memoir of the Great Depression, The Invisible Scar, she recalled, "Eviction was so common that children in a Philadelphia day-care center made a game of it. They would pile all the doll furniture up first in one corner and then in another." Rents dropped precipitously during the 1930s, but however low they fell, unemployed workers could not afford to pay them. Tired of moving, desperate for housing and self-respect, they began to fight the evictions. Women played a central role in eviction protests. They had built up neighborhood networks over the years, visiting, sharing work with and caring for neighbors, gossiping, distributing home work, and taking in boarders. Now these women's neighborhood networks were matched by newer networks of unemployed men. With the help of the Communist party, they united into Unemployed Councils. These councils organized the bulk of the eviction protests, but it was the neighborhood networks that made them successful. In cities as different as New York, Baltimore, and Sioux City, Iowa, women and men would gather up the neighborhood and march to a site where a city official, on behalf of