1. How did Hollywood portray World War II in its films?

2. What was the Bracero Program? What was its original purpose?

3. How many Japanese were sent to internment camps? How did the Supreme Court come down on the issue in the Korematsu case?

4. What was the greatest naval battle of the war? Why was it so important?

5. What was the purpose of the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944?

6. What did the creation of the United Nations toward the end of the war say about America’s view of itself in the world?
7. Before the United States entered the war, how did Roosevelt try to help England? What did the U.S. get in return?

8. What was the purpose of the Lend-Lease Act?

9. How did World War II both positively and negatively affect the economy of the United States?

10. Why were some textile workers displeased with the economic results of the war?

11. What were C.O.s? How did their numbers compare to WWI?

12. Why were many African Americans “indifferent” or “apathetic” about the war?

13. What was the purpose of the Smith Act?

14. What word would you use to describe the bombing of Dresden? Explain.
Document that same year, she excised some of the work’s more critical comments on the country’s history.31

But if social celebration, not social criticism, was the order of the day, what was celebrated was the resiliency of a people united in respect for diversity. Americanism meant toleration, and bigots were portrayed as a fifth column more dangerous than spies and saboteurs. Parents magazine warned that the “intolerances” of adults had done great harm to children and the nation. “The four freedoms,” it concluded, “will have little meaning for anyone who is not convinced of the inherent dignity of every human being of every race, color, and creed.” Horrified by the uses to which the Nazis put the idea of inborn racial difference, physical and social scientists retreated wholesale from the idea of race, only recently central to their disciplines. The writings of Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and other anthropologists critical of the link between race, culture, and ability now for the first time reached a mass audience. Benedict’s Raas and Racism, published in 1942, described racism as “a travesty of scientific knowledge.” In the same year, Ashley Montagu’s Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race became a bestseller. By the war’s end, racism and nativism had been stripped of intellectual respectability and equated with pathology and irrationality.32

Hollywood too did its part, portraying fighting units whose members represented the various regional, ethnic, and religious groups—typically a Jew, a southerner, and a sprinkling of Italians, Poles, Irish, and Scandinavians—putting aside parochial loyalties and prejudices for the common cause. In the 1943 film Battan, the ethnically balanced celluloid platoon included a black soldier, even though the real U.S. Army was still racially segregated. The war’s most popular film, This Is the Army, starring, among others, future president Ronald Reagan, offered a vision of postwar society in which the Four Freedoms were linked to celebration of the ethnic diversity of the American people.33

Intolerance, of course, hardly disappeared from American life. T. C. Upsham, a theatrical director from New Jersey, complained to Norman Rockwell that in his Freedom of Worship painting, too many of the faces were “foreign-looking.” But the war made millions of ethnic Americans, especially the Jewish and Catholic children of the new immigrants, feel fully American for the first time. If the pluralism of the CIO and the Popular Front had begun the process of forging the new immigrants into a white working class, the war greatly accelerated the process. They benefited enormously from wartime fair employment policies (more so than blacks, for whom such rules were initiated). During the war, one New York “ethnic” recalled, “the Italo-Americans stopped being Italo and

Arthur Poinier’s cartoon for the Detroit Free Press, 19 June 1941, graphically illustrates how during World War II, white ethnics were incorporated within the boundaries of American freedom. (Reprinted by permission of the Detroit Free Press)

Private efforts at mobilization also embraced the notion that the country’s strength lay in diversity and the image of Americans casting aside old enmities to unite as a single people in a common struggle. Originally popularized by the Popular Front in the 1930s, these ideas now moved to the center stage of mass culture. To be sure, in the interest of wartime unity the Depression-era focus on the people was shorn of some of its critical edges. In 1942, the Museum of Modern Art in New York mounted a major exhibition, “Road to Victory.” A heartwarming patriotic endeavor, it featured photographs of a diverse populace at work, at play, and at war, but studiously avoided the downbeat social realist images so prominent during the 1930s. When Martha Graham revived American
started becoming Americans." But the event that inspired this comment, the Harlem race riot of 1943, suggested that such assimilation stopped at the color line.34

Despite the abhorrence of Nazi racism, the war's meaning for non-white groups was far more ambiguous than for whites. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, racial barriers remained deeply entrenched in American life. The vast majority of blacks were locked within the rigid caste system of the segregated South. Asians were still barred from emigrating to the country or becoming naturalized citizens. Mexican-Americans, historically considered "white" by the U.S. Census Bureau, had been reclassified as a non-white race in 1930 and during the early years of the Depression over 400,000 had been "voluntarily" repatriated by local authorities in the Southwest. Most of the adults "encouraged" to leave the country were recent immigrants, but perhaps 200,000 were American-born (and therefore citizen) children.35

The war set in motion changes that would reverberate in the postwar years. Thanks to the Bracero program agreed upon by the Mexican and American governments, large-scale immigration from Mexico resumed as tens of thousands of contract laborers crossed into the United States. Designed as a temporary measure to meet the wartime labor shortage in the agricultural fields of the Southwest, the program lasted into the 1960s and stimulated a far broader movement of Mexican men, women, and children into the United States. Congress in 1943 ended decades of exclusion by establishing a nationality quota for immigrants from China, now an ally in the Pacific War, although the annual limit of one hundred and five Chinese hardly suggested a desire for large-scale immigration. Nonetheless, the image of Chinese as gallant allies called into question anti-Asian stereotypes.36

Far different was the experience of Japanese-Americans. Longstanding racial animosities and the shocking attack on Pearl Harbor combined to produce an unprecedented hatred of Japan. "In all our history," according to the historian Allan Nevin, "no foe has been detested as were the Japanese." Government propaganda and war films demonized the Japanese as rats, dogs, gorillas, and snakes—bestial and subhuman. Japanese aggression was said to stem from innate racial characteristics or national character, not, as in the case of Germany and Italy, from tyrannical rulers. Even Frank Sinatra's popular short film, The House I Live In, based on a Popular Front song that celebrated the United States as a land of "all races and religions," consistently used the word "Japs."37

As the Pacific conflict took on overtones of a race war, the Japanese-American community could not remain unaffected, even though a considerable majority were American citizens. The federal government bent over backward to include German-Americans and Italian-Americans in the war effort and examined the loyalty of nationals of its European foes on a case-by-case basis. But it assumed that every person of Japanese origin was a potential spy. Inspired by fears of an impending Japanese invasion of California, and by covetous eyes cast by many whites on Japanese-American property holdings, the military persuaded the Roosevelt administration to order the removal of persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast. In the spring and summer of 1942, nearly 120,000 men, women, and children, more than two-thirds of them American citizens, were removed to internment camps far from their homes.38

One searches the wartime record in vain for public protests among non-Japanese. In Congress, only Senator Robert Taft spoke out against the greatest violation of civil liberties since the end of slavery. Groups publicly committed to fighting discrimination, from the Communist Party to the NAACP and the American Jewish Committee, either defended the internment or remained silent. The ACLU promised to represent Gordon K. Hirabayashi, who challenged a West Coast curfew applying only to Japanese-Americans, but soon withdrew from the case. In 1943, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Hirabayashi's plea, and in the following year, in the Korematsu decision, the justices rejected the appeal of a Japanese-American citizen against the internment policy. Speaking for the 6–3 majority, Justice Hugo Black, usually an avid defender of civil liberties, managed to persuade himself that an order applying only to persons of Japanese descent was not based on race. In the fall of 1944, the Court did order to release of a Japanese-American woman whose loyalty had been definitively established. But it never examined the constitutionality of the incarceration program as a whole. Somewhat incongruously, the government marketed war bonds to the internees and recruited soldiers from among them. One of the main activities in the camps was the education of Japanese-American children. "One of our basic subjects was American history," Peter Ota, imprisoned at a desolate internment center in Amache, Colorado, later recalled. "They talked about freedom all the time."39

If the treatment of Japanese-Americans revealed the stubborn hold of racism in American life, the wartime message of freedom and tolerance portended a major transformation in the status of blacks. "There never has been, there isn't now, and there never will be," Roosevelt declared, "any race of people on the earth fit to serve as masters over their fellow men." Yet Nazi Germany cited American segregation as proof of its own race theories, and the Japanese (who during the war ruled tyrannically over Koreans, Chinese, and other Asians) cast themselves as defenders of the rights of non-white peoples against a racist United States. In 1940 and 1941, even as Roosevelt called for aid to the free peo-
Admiral Yamamoto headed for Midway Island, a base of strategic importance because of its location 1,000 miles northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. For the United States, the capture of Midway by the Japanese would have been catastrophic. But American experts had broken the Japanese code, and a fleet under Admiral Chester Nimitz lay in wait. In a titanic battle that lasted from June 3 to June 6, 1942, torpedo bombers from the U.S. aircraft carriers Yorktown, Hornet, and Enterprise decimated the Japanese fleet, sinking four aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, and three destroyers, and shooting down or destroying 275 airplanes. Yamamoto retreated with what remained of his fleet. This battle stopped the eastward advance of the Japanese, rescued Hawaii from possible invasion, and restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific to American hands.

Then began a period of successful “island hopping,” with the invasion of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands in August 1942, Tarawa in the Gilberts in November 1943, Guam and Saipan in 1944, and Iwo Jima in March 1945. The following month—April 1945—marines invaded Okinawa and captured it on June 21. American forces were now poised only 350 miles from Japan itself. The U.S. Pacific fleet consisted of 24 battleships, 26 cruisers, 64 escort carriers, 333 destroyers, and 15,000 combat airplanes.

On October 20, 1944, General MacArthur began an invasion of the Philippines. From October 23 to 25 the naval battle of Leyte Gulf took place. It was the last and greatest naval battle of the war. It extended over hundreds of miles and involved 35 large and small aircraft carriers, 21 battleships, 35 cruisers, hundreds of destroyers, submarines, motor torpedo boats, and more than 1,500 aircraft in four separate engagements. The American forces could have been annihilated because Admiral Halsey and his Third Fleet had been lured away to the north, leaving Admiral Clifton Sprague to protect the invasion of the Philippines, but the Japanese suddenly withdrew from the battle after losing 4 carriers, 2 battleships, 9 cruisers, and 9 destroyers. The American forces then invaded Luzon, the principal island of the Philippines, and captured Manila on February 23, 1945.

In January 1943 Roosevelt met with Winston Churchill in Casablanca and agreed to demand “unconditional surrender” by Germany as the only acceptable terms for ending the war. Achieving that goal began with the invasion of Italy, followed on June 6, 1944, with a massive invasion of France by American and British troops, called Operation Overlord, under the command of General Eisenhower. Some 176,000 Allied troops aboard 4,000 landing craft, supported by 600 warships and an air cover of 10,000 planes, crossed the English Channel; landed along a fifty-nine-mile stretch of the Normandy coastline; and began the recapture of Europe. It was the greatest amphibious landing operation ever undertaken, and it faced stiff opposition by a strong German defense. Weeks of heavy fighting followed before the Allies broke through and occupied Paris on August 25. Six Allied armies, totaling more than 3 million men, slammed their way to the Siegfried Line, smashed it, and crossed the Rhine River on March 7, 1945.

Meanwhile, FDR had won a fourth term as President the previous November when he and his running mate, Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri, defeated Governor Thomas Dewey of New York and Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio by capturing over 26 million popular and 522 electoral votes, against 22 million popular votes and 99 electoral votes for Dewey. The choice of Truman for Vice President resulted from his superb handling of a Senate committee investigating the National Defense Program. He was a devoted and knowledgeable student of American history who did not wish his committee to be guilty of the blunders committed during the Civil War by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.

On the eastern front, the Soviets had launched a counteroffensive, following a meeting of FDR, Churchill, and Stalin in Tehran, Iran, on November 28, 1943, that reaffirmed Stalin’s commitment to enter the war against Japan and establish an international union to keep the peace after the war. The Soviets lifted the siege of Leningrad, recaptured Stalingrad, and drove the Germans out of Russia.

In another action to address possible problems once the war ended, Congress passed the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the G.I. Bill of Rights, which authorized the Veterans Administration to assist veterans of World War II in readjusting to civilian life by providing academic training, medical assistance, loans, and employment programs. It was an immediate success. Within ten years more than half of all World War II veterans had taken advantage of one or more of the many benefits provided by the G.I. Bill.
Meanwhile, the Allied forces drove across Europe, and Germany was subjected to constant and devastating air raids. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met in Yalta on February 4–11, 1945, to plan the shape of Europe and the division of Germany after the war. Two months later, on April 12, 1945, FDR died of a cerebral hemorrhage in Warm Springs, Georgia. The elevation of Harry Truman to the presidency came just as Soviet forces were about to launch an assault on Berlin, something Churchill had pleaded with Eisenhower to prevent. The British Prime Minister wanted the Allied powers to occupy Berlin, but Eisenhower rejected the plea for military reasons. The general felt it was more important to prevent the escape of the German army to mountain strongholds in Bavaria. The capture of Berlin was not worth the loss of American and British lives, he argued. The German capital fell to the Russians on May 2, Hitler committed suicide, and on May 7 his successor, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, ordered all German naval and land forces to surrender. The unconditional surrender was signed by German delegates at Eisenhower's headquarters the following day in the city of Rheims.

On July 28, 1945, the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter, which committed the United States to a policy of internationalism, and the United Nations officially began its operations on October 24, 1945. Although isolationism in the United States had not vanished completely, a larger number of Americans now believed the nation could not escape its responsibility in keeping the peace around the world.

Russia finally declared war against Japan on August 8 and invaded Manchuria. When the United States, Britain, and China demanded that Japan surrender unconditionally, the demand was rejected. Whereupon Truman ordered that the first atom bomb be dropped on the military base and city of Hiroshima. The bombing occurred on August 6, killing and injuring over 160,000 people. Three days later a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, wiping out the city.

And that did it. On August 14, the Japanese accepted unconditional surrender, but were permitted to retain their emperor, subject to the orders of the supreme commander of Allied forces in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur.

Thus ended one of the most destructive wars—if not the most destructive war—in world history.

Shortly before the end of World War II, Harry Truman delivered his first address as President to a joint session of Congress in which he promised to defend the ideals advanced by FDR and bring an end to “Hitler's ghastly threat to dominate the world.” Shortly thereafter, Mussolini was captured and hanged by Italian partisans, and Hitler killed himself in his bunker in Berlin. “The armies of liberation,” to use Truman's phrase, had defeated fascism, but one danger to world peace still remained: communism. And fear of communism and its possible spread into the free world intensified in the United States for the next several decades. It became the leading issue in shaping both domestic and foreign policy.

The House of Representatives converted the Dies Committee into the Committee on Un-American Activities in 1945, and this committee, under Democratic control during the Seventy-Ninth Congress, avoided controversy. But when the Republicans won a majority in the House following the midterm election of 1946, the chairman of the Un-American Activities Committee, Parnell Thomas of New Jersey, conducted hearings, in October 1947, into the motion picture industry and made almost daily headlines in the newspapers. Movie stars and studio executives appeared before the committee and were asked to name those persons they knew who had joined the Communist Party. Ten accused screenwriters and producers were asked about their affiliation with subversive organizations. The “Hollywood Ten” they were called, and they challenged the right of the committee to inquire into
of propaganda, were the most responsible for the entry of the United States into this capitalist civil war. Now in the 1920s and 1930s, the same forces were again at work. “If the last World War grew mainly out of commercial rivalry,” Beard declared, “and if we now see signs of a more intense rivalry than ever, supported by all the powerful agencies of government, what then shall we say of the future?” His answer and that of many other intellectuals, among them John Dewey, was isolation.

After he had won re-election, Roosevelt began a campaign to reverse this trend to neutrality. He made a major speech at Chicago in 1937 warning of the dangers of Japanese aggression as well as that of Germany and Italy. Adolf Hitler had come to power in Germany in 1933. Part of his plan to end economic and social chaos was to defy the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations and rearm Germany. He also planned to bolster the economy by using national political power to expand German export markets. Italy, under the leadership of Benito Mussolini, also was attempting to overcome economic problems through overseas expansion.

With Japan challenging the Open Door policy of the United States in China and Germany making similar challenges to the American policy in Europe, the Roosevelt administration felt even more threatened by the attempts of these nations to establish markets in Latin America, an area that American economic leaders had considered a special preserve of the United States since 1900. “We’re just going to wake up and find that Italy, Germany, and Japan have taken over Mexico,” warned Henry Morgenthau, the secretary of the treasury.

Roosevelt failed to rally public opinion to his position in 1937, but he did persuade Congress to enlarge the navy in 1938. Not until 1939, as Europe approached the outbreak of World War II, could Roosevelt persuade Congress to modify the Neutrality Acts and end the embargo on the sale of arms. In the spring of 1940, his campaign for greater political and military involvement against Japan, Germany, and Italy led to the passage of a huge $18 billion appropriation for military preparedness, and in September 1940, Congress passed the first peacetime conscription act. Roosevelt, who had been transferring government armaments to private interests so they could be sold to England, acted directly by issuing an executive agreement in which he made a gift of fifty destroyers to England in return for the right to establish American military bases on several British possessions.

As the election of 1940 approached, however, public-opinion polls continued to indicate that the overwhelming majority of Americans wanted to keep out of the war in Europe. Roosevelt, who had arranged to have the Democratic Convention draft him to run for an unprecedented third term, promised in his campaign speeches that “I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”

Wendell Willkie, the Republican candidate, approved Roosevelt’s foreign policy. His nomination represented a victory for those Republicans who agreed with Roosevelt that political and military power must be used to defend the international marketplace. Within the Republican party, there was a tendency for corporate leaders from the East to support Willkie’s philosophy of “One World,” while business interests from the Midwest tended to align with the America First Committee, which was opposed to military intervention. These “isolationists,” headed by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, supported Hoover’s contention that “it is fairly certain that capitalism cannot survive American participation in this war.”

After his victory in 1940, Roosevelt moved rapidly to integrate the United States with the war effort of England, now standing alone against Nazi Germany. He persuaded Congress to pass a Lend-Lease Act in early 1941, making it possible for the government to give England all the arms and supplies it needed. Roosevelt and his military advisers entered into secret conferences with English leaders on the overall strategy of the war effort against Germany and Japan. These talks were based on the assumption that the United States soon would enter the war. The agreement was to defeat Germany first and then turn to Japan. Through the summer and fall of 1941, Roosevelt ordered the Navy to attack German submarines that interfered with supply ships bound for England as far as Iceland, where bases had been taken over by the United States. In October 1941, Roosevelt announced to the American people on radio that “America has been attacked by German rattlesnakes of the sea” and “the shooting has started.”

The undeclared war in the North Atlantic became a declared war when the Japanese armed forces attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. Throughout the previous year, Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull had refused to sell crucial resources, especially oil and steel, to the Japanese. This embargo had created a political crisis in Japan between those who desired further Japanese expansion short of war with the
United States and those who insisted that war was inevitable. Now the war party demanded an immediate war to gain the economic supplies denied to Japan by America. They argued that a delay would weaken the Japanese resource base and so began to prepare for an attack on the United States. Meanwhile, the peace party was given a last chance to negotiate the reopening of trade with the United States. American intelligence had cracked the Japanese secret codes and knew of these plans. Roosevelt and Hull understood the consequences that would follow from their refusal to negotiate, but somehow the commanders at Pearl Harbor were not adequately prepared. On December 8, Roosevelt asked Congress to recognize that a state of war existed with Japan. In the Senate, the vote was 82 to 0; in the House, 388 to 1. Germany and Italy, bound to Japan by treaties, now declared war against the United States. The formal declaration of war had come, even though public-opinion polls in 1945 indicated that 80 percent of Americans still believed that President Roosevelt had violated his campaign pledge of 1940 to keep America out of war.

The outbreak of World War II, however, enabled Roosevelt to forge a new alliance with corporate leaders. In 1939, anticipating war and calling on his experience with the “industrial-military complex” of 1917, Roosevelt appointed a War Resources Board headed by Edward Stettinius of U.S. Steel. And after American entry into World War II, Roosevelt was able to fulfill his dream of a planned economy dominated by large private corporations operating without price competition. He was able once again to duplicate the experience of World War I with a War Production Board, a Food Administration, an Office of Economic Stabilization, a War Manpower Commission, and an Office of Price Administration. This planning went further, however, than that of World War I and included rationing. As in World War I, the planned economy was run by corporate leaders—William Knudsen and Charles Wilson of General Motors, Ralph Budd of the Great Northern Railroad, William Jeffer of the Union Pacific, and Donald Nelson of Sears, Roebuck as well as Stettinius from U.S. Steel.

The government promised that there was to be no antitrust activity to hinder cooperation and coordination among the giant corporations. Nor need they concern themselves with competition, since government contracts were given on a cost-plus basis in which the government agreed to pay the corporations any unexpected manu-

facturing expenses and financed the conversion of factories to war production.

Business leaders had bitterly attacked Roosevelt for doubling the national debt from $19 to $43 billion to help the poor and the unemployed. During the war, he found that they were willing to accept unlimited deficit spending for national defense. Between 1940 and 1945, $200 billion was added to the national debt. Industrial production doubled by 1942 and increased dramatically again by 1945. More industrial plants were built than during the years from 1929 to 1941. Full employment was reached for the first time in the twentieth century. Workers’ income increased 50 percent while corporate profits doubled.

When the war ended in 1945, the country had never been so prosperous. But a pattern had been set that would lead to severe economic problems by 1975. Between 1945 and 1970, the federal government spent $1,000 billion, 60 percent of its total budget, on defense spending. The development of a cold war with Communist Russia and China at the end of the 1940s provided a convenient rationale for massive government spending that was acceptable to business, organized labor, and the average voter. Large corporations, in making an alliance with the Roosevelt New Deal during World War II, had accepted the administration’s inclusion of organized labor within the establishment. Union strength, which had risen from three million in 1933 to ten million in 1941, increased to fifteen million by 1944. As membership increased another two million by 1950, labor leaders gave their blessing to the cold war and the large-scale government spending that accompanied it.

The bulk of this government spending passed to the largest corporations, where unions had most strongly established themselves. As Charles Wilson of General Motors said during the war, “This defense business is big business. Small plants can’t make tanks, airplanes, or other complex armaments.” After the war, Wilson as a member of President Eisenhower’s Cabinet further clarified the relationship: “What’s good for General Motors is good for the country.”

Roosevelt’s success in leading the United States into a war against the wishes of the majority of voters depended upon his popularity in the area of domestic politics. From 1933 to 1940, Roosevelt had given groups outside the male WASP establishment a new sense of participation in national life. Women, Catholics, blacks, lower-middle-class white southerners, academic intellectuals, and artists,
In Lowell, Massachusetts, for example, according to an unpublished manuscript by Marc Miller ("The Irony of Victory: Lowell During World War II"), there were as many strikes in 1943 and 1944 as in 1937. It may have been a "people's war," but here was dissatisfaction at the fact that the textile mill profits grew 600 percent from 1940 to 1946, while wage increases in cotton goods industries went up 36 percent. How little the war changed the difficult condition of women workers is shown by the fact that in Lowell, among women war workers with children, only 5 percent could have their children taken care of by nursery schools; the others had to make their own arrangements.

Beneath the noise of enthusiastic patriotism, there were many people who thought war was wrong, even in the circumstances of Fascist aggression. Out of 10 million drafted for the armed forces during World War II, only 43,000 refused to fight. But this was three times the proportion of C.O.'s (conscientious objectors) in World War I. Of these 43,000, about 6,000 went to prison, which was, proportionately, four times the number of C.O.'s who went to prison during World War I. Of every six men in federal prison, one was there as a C.O.

Many more than 43,000 refusals did not show up for the draft at all. The government lists about 350,000 cases of draft evasion, including technical violations as well as actual desertion, so it is hard to tell the true number, but it may be that the number of men who either did not show up or claimed C.O. status was in the hundreds of thousands—not a small number. And this in the face of an American community almost unanimously for the war.

Among those soldiers who were not conscientious objectors, who seemed willing fighters, it is hard to know how much resentment there was against authority, against having to fight in a war whose aims were unclear, inside a military machine whose lack of democracy was very clear. No one recorded the bitterness of enlisted men against the special privileges of officers in the army of a country known as a democracy. To give just one instance: combat crews in the air force in the European theater, going to the base movies between bombing missions, found two lines—an officers' line (short), and an enlisted men's line (very long). There were two mess halls, even as they prepared to go into combat, the enlisted men's food was different—worse—than the officers'.

The literature that followed World War II, James Jones's *From Here to Eternity*, Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, and Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead*, captured this GI anger against the army "brass." In *The Naked and the Dead*, the soldiers talk in battle, and one of them says: "The only thing wrong with this Army is it never lost a war."

Toglio was shocked. "You think we ought to lose this one?"

Red found himself carried away. "What have I against the goddam Japs? You think I care if they keep this fuggin jungle? What's it to me if Cummings gets another star?"

"General Cummings, he's a good man," Martinez said.

"There ain't a good officer in the world," Red stated.

There seemed to be widespread indifference, even hostility, on the part of the Negro community to the war despite the attempts of Negro newspapers and Negro leaders to mobilize black sentiment. Lawrence Wittern (*Rebels Against War*) quotes a black journalist: "The Negro . . . is angry, resentful, and utterly apathetic about the war. 'Fight for what?' he is asking. 'This war doesn't mean a thing to me. If we win I lose, so what?'" A black army officer, home on furlough, told friends in Harlem he had been in hundreds of bull sessions with Negro soldiers and found no interest in the war.

A student at a Negro college told his teacher: "The Army Jim-crows us. The Navy lets us serve only as messmen. The Red Cross refuses our blood. Employers and labor unions shut us out. Lynchings continue. We are discriminated against, Jim-crowed, spat upon. What more could Hitler do than this?" NAACP leader Walter White repeated this to a black audience of several thousand people in the Midwest, thinking they would disapprove, but instead, as he recalled: "To my surprise and dismay the audience burst into such applause that it took me some thirty or forty seconds to quiet it."

In January 1943, there appeared in a Negro newspaper this "Draftee's Prayer":

Dear Lord, today
I go to war:
To fight, to die,
Tell me what for?
Dear Lord, I'll fight,
I do not fear,
Germans or Japs;
My fears are here.
America!

But there was no organized Negro opposition to the war. In fact, there was little organized opposition from any source. The Communist party was enthusiastically in support. The Socialist party was divided, unable to make a clear statement one way or the other.
A few small anarchist and pacifist groups refused to back the war. The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom said: “... war between nations or classes or races cannot permanently settle conflicts or heal the wounds that brought them into being.” The Catholic Worker wrote: “We are still pacifists...”

The difficulty of merely calling for “peace” in a world of capitalism, Fascism, Communism—dynamic ideologies, aggressive actions—troubled some pacifists. They began to speak of “revolutionary nonviolence.” A. J. Muste of the Fellowship of Reconciliation said in later years: “I was not impressed with the sentimental, easygoing pacifism of the earlier part of the century. People then felt that if they sat and talked pleasantly of peace and love, they would solve the problems of the world.” The world was in the midst of a revolution, Muste realized, and those against violence must take revolutionary action, but without violence. A movement of revolutionary pacifism would have to “make effective contacts with oppressed and minority groups such as Negroes, share-croppers, industrial workers.”

Only one organized socialist group opposed the war unequivocally. This was the Socialist Workers Party. The Espionage Act of 1917, still on the books, applied to wartime statements. But in 1940, with the United States not yet at war, Congress passed the Smith Act. This took Espionage Act prohibitions against talk or writing that would lead to refusal of duty in the armed forces and applied them to peace time. The Smith Act also made it a crime to advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence, or to join any group that advocated this, or to publish anything with such ideas. In Minneapolis in 1943, eighteen members of the Socialist Workers party were convicted for belonging to a party whose ideas, expressed in its Declaration of Principles, and in the Communist Manifesto, were said to violate the Smith Act. They were sentenced to prison terms, and the Supreme Court refused to review their case.

A few voices continued to insist that the real war was inside each nation: Dwight Macdonald’s wartime magazine Politics presented, in early 1945, an article by the French worker-philosopher Simone Weil:

Still, the vast bulk of the American population was mobilized, in the army, and in civilian life, to fight the war, and the atmosphere of war enveloped more and more Americans. Public opinion polls show large majorities of soldiers favoring the draft for the postwar period. Hatred against the enemy, against the Japanese particularly, became widespread. Racism was clearly at work. Time magazine, reporting the battle of Iwo Jima, said: “The ordinary unreasoning Jap is ignorant. Perhaps he is human. Nothing...indicates it.”

So, there was a mass base of support for what became the heaviest bombardment of civilians ever undertaken in any war: the aerial attacks on German and Japanese cities. One might argue that this popular support made it a “people’s war.” But if “people’s war” means a war of people against attack, a defensive war—if it means a war fought for humane reasons instead of for the privileges of an elite, a war against the few, not the many—then the tactics of all-out aerial assault against the populations of Germany and Japan destroy that notion.

Italy had bombed cities in the Ethiopian war; Italy and Germany had bombed civilians in the Spanish Civil War; at the start of World War II German planes dropped bombs on Rotterdam in Holland, Coventry in England, and elsewhere. Roosevelt had described these as “inhuman barbarism that has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity.”

These German bombings were very small compared with the British and American bombings of German cities. In January 1943 the Allies met at Casablanca and agreed on large-scale air attacks to achieve “the destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.” And so, the saturation bombing of German cities began—with thousand-plane raids on Cologne, Essen, Frankfurt, Hamburg. The English flew at night with no pretense of aiming at “military” targets; the Americans flew in the daytime and pretended precision, but bombing from high altitudes made that impossible. The climax of this terror bombing was the bombing of Dresden in early 1945, in which the tremendous heat generated by the bombs created a vacuum into which fire leaped swiftly in a great firestorm through the city. More than 100,000 died in Dresden. (Winston Churchill, in his wartime memoirs, confessed himself to this account of the incident: “We made a heavy raid in the latter month on Dresden, then a centre of communication of Germany’s Eastern Front.”)

The bombing of Japanese cities continued the strategy of saturation bombing to destroy civilian morale; one nighttime fire-bombing of